

CONCLUSION

SALAFISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

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At the turn of the twenty-first century, Salafism was still largely *terra incognita*. The vast amount of research produced up to that point on the Islamic revival since the 1970s focused on Islamist political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i Islami, and especially on their militant off-shoots – the jihadi organisations that fought their governments and the West under the inspiration of the radical Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb. On the Shi‘i side, academic attention was directed by the nature of things to the Islamic revolution in Iran and to its Lebanese extension, Hizballah.¹ The major theoretical debates of the time raged around the appropriateness of the term ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the relation of Islamism to modernity and globalisation.² The term ‘Salafism’, at least in the scholarly literature, was mostly confined to the historical modernist movement of the turn of the twentieth century and to those considered its main protagonists: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Muhammad Rashid Rida.³

This began to change in the wake of the terror attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. It then transpired that there was another major theological/ideological force behind the contemporary Islamic revival from which global Islamic radicalisation imbibed. Al-Qaida and its ilk were accordingly portrayed as jihadi-Salafi organisations. The roots of this trend were traced to Saudi Arabia, from which fifteen out of the nineteen perpetra-

tors of 9/11 originated, and to its puritan brand of Islam – Wahhabism.⁴ Western public attention was turned to the obscurantist and xenophobic tenets of the Wahhabi creed and their worldwide propagation under Saudi aegis and with petrodollars funding.⁵ Others put the blame on the internal dissent of the 1990s (the Saudi Islamic Awakening), which, inspired by the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, protested against the subservience of the senior Wahhabi scholars to the ruling house and its alliance with the United States.⁶ The influential typology of the Salafis into purists, politicians and jihadis⁷ stems from such perceptions, hence reflecting the state of this trend at the turn of the twentieth century.

Salafism has emerged from 9/11 on as one of the hottest issues in the study of contemporary Islam and among the public at large. The present volume, with its fine mixture of ethnographic and textual perspectives, makes a valuable contribution to this burgeoning research, and is thus a worthy sequence to the previous volumes on the topic edited by Rougier, Meijer, and Cavatorta and Merone.⁸ In the following, I will try to pull together the various issues raised by its ten chapters and place them within the larger context of the evolution and diversification of the Salafi trend during the first two decades of the twenty-first century. I begin with a short discussion of the problematics of the concept Salafism and the debates it evokes between protagonists and detractors. I then move on to examine the trajectory of its factions against the backdrop of the major religio-political developments of the period: the opening up of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Spring and the rise of jihadism from al-Qaida to Islamic State (ISIS). These developments are embedded in the underlying processes of globalisation, and especially the spread of social media,⁹ which the Salafis have proved to be highly apt in using. My conclusion points to a perceptible weakening of the current rigid forms of Salafism associated with the Wahhabi creed and a cautious revival of its earlier, more open version.

Salafism and Anti-Salafism

The first task that faces students of contemporary Salafism (Arab. *salafiyya*) is to define it. This has proved to be trickier than might appear at first, and the issue is still not satisfactorily resolved. The general idea is quite simple. The term *salafiyya* refers to the call to return to the exemplary model of the pious

ancestors – *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* – in their understanding and application of the Qur’ān and the Prophet’s way (*sunna*). This implies the rejection, to some extent or another, of latter-day harmful innovations (sing. *bid’a*) and aims at restoring the glory of Islam – so that God’s word be supreme. Yet, beyond this apparent simplicity lie a bewildering array of thinkers and movements that differ on almost every point. Even among the Salafis themselves there is no consensus on who is to be included among the ancestors, what exactly constitutes the legacy they left behind and, most importantly, which ways should be adopted in realising their model in the present condition. The wide differences on such questions have often led to bitter controversies, acrimonious denunciations and mutual accusations of deviation and disbelief (*takfir*) among the Salafis, as well as between them and other streams in the Muslim community. It is thus even difficult to decide who is to be considered a Salafi and who is not.¹⁰

In view of this situation, it is no wonder that scholarly works on the topic habitually begin with the question of ‘what is Salafism?’ Beyond noting its derivation from the concept of *al-salaf*, they usually dwell on the primacy in its teachings of God’s unity (*tawḥīd*), its literalist interpretation of the Qur’ān, preoccupation with the science of *ḥadīth*, rejection of traditional legal methodology, rational theology and Sufism, and its special way of being in the world (*manhaj*).¹¹ Some also refer to the division within the Salafi camp between adherents of the Hanbali school and those who dismiss the whole system of law schools. These are the characteristics of the hegemonic form of contemporary Salafism, which consists of the Wahhabis and their affiliates outside Saudi Arabia, on one hand, and the modern *Ahl al-Ḥadīth*, especially the followers of the *ḥadīth* scholar Nasir al-Din al-Albani, on the other hand.¹² Yet, in the scholarly literature one often comes across the epithet ‘Salafi’ in relation to a myriad of other Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brothers, the Tabligh-i Jama’at, Deoband, the Taliban, Islamic modernists and whatever else.

Elsewhere, I suggested solving the confusion by distinguishing between a broad and a narrow meaning of Salafism. In its broader sense it refers to the ideology-cum-theology that underlies practically all modern Sunni Islamic movements, as all of them strive, in some way or another, to keep a balance between an authentic Islamic identity and a quest for modernisation. In its

narrow sense, it points to the current usage of the term, which is associated with the combined Wahhabi/ *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* ultra-conservative version, and with its political and jihadi off-shoots. The term ‘modernism’ refers, in this scheme, to the intellectually oriented non-Wahhabi/ *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* Salafis, which began with the nineteenth century Islamic reformers, while ‘Islamism’ denotes their politically oriented counterparts, first and foremost the Muslim Brotherhood. Both are Salafis in the broader sense. The motor for change in the Salafi trend are the hybrid forms, which combined the types: the early modernist Salafis and the Saudi *Ṣaḥwa*.¹³

Accordingly, of the four anti-Salafi groups that Fouad Hazim presents in the opening chapter of this volume, the first two – the traditional ‘*ulamā*’ and the Sufis – are opposed to Salafism at large, although they too, by their very engagement, are influenced by its vocabulary and methodology. His other two groups – the modernists and the reformists – are themselves part of the broader Salafi camp, so that their criticism is directed only at its current Wahhabi/ *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* narrow brand. The essential commonalities and differences among these groups are mirrored in their respective arguments. The ‘*ulamā*’ in their legal and theological schools reproach the core Wahhabi-Salafi methodology of relying solely on the Qur’ān and *sunna*, which in their eyes is the cause of their exclusivity, rigidity and rigor. They likewise reject the modernist rational judgment (*ijtihād*) and Islamist enmeshment in politics as sources of deviation. The Sufis in their brotherhoods follow suite in denouncing the Wahhabis for denying the Prophet Muhammad’s lofty spiritual status and deriding the celebration of his *mawlid*, and the modernists and Islamists for relying on books and for forming political parties in the Western style.

On the other side, the modernists challenge the relevance attributed by the Wahhabis and *Ahl al-Ḥadīth* to the *ḥadīth* collections in solving contemporary problems and demand the embracing of modern ethics in place of their archaic corporal punishments and hate speech. The reformists in Hazim’s definition are intellectuals/academics living in the Western diaspora, who add their criticism of Salafi formalism and stagnation and the Salafi degradation of women. I would rather combine the last two categories under the rubric of modernists and pose as the fourth group the Islamists, who censure the Wahhabis for their shunning of the political and their subservience to the rulers.

Saudi Arabia Opening Up

In view of the salient place of the Wahhabiyya in the contemporary Salafi movement, the opening up of Saudi Arabia may be regarded as the sole most influential factor in its evolution in the twenty-first century. Its roots lie in the endeavour of the Saudi ruling house to ward off international incriminations concerning the kingdom's responsibility for the attacks of 9/11 and in the subsequent wave of terror that swept the country in 2003–6.¹⁴ Crown Prince, later King Abdallah (r. 2005–15) introduced a set of reforms that touched upon most aspects of life in the conservative kingdom: school curricula, higher education at home and overseas, the consultative councils, the status of women, and national and international dialogue.¹⁵ The reforms were greatly accelerated with the announcement in April 2016 of Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman's ambitious Vision 2030. In her chapter, which is based on extensive fieldwork and interviews in Saudi Arabia, Masooda Bano records the revolutionary nature of the reforms envisioned by the General Entertainment Authority, as well as the surprising speed at which such programmes became a reality. This she attributes to the growing pressure for change coming from the educated and media-savvy youth, and to the correspondingly weakening appeal of conservative Wahhabi-Salafi conceptualisations of society.

To be sure, the practice of religion continues to dominate the Saudi public scene, as I myself could witness during a tour of the country in February 2020. Shops and restaurants close during prayer times, buses are segregated, and the great majority of women stick to the black *niqab* covering everything but their eyes (and sometimes to the *burqa* covering even them). Still, the notorious religious police (*muṭaawwi'*) have now been withdrawn from the streets; women are allowed to work and drive; and foreign tourists are welcome. Apart from politics and subject to the prevailing social norms, information flows relatively freely, with smartphone shops being the busiest enterprises these days. People I talked with, especially the young, were enthusiastic about Muhammad bin Salman and his policies, Khashoggie's brutal murder notwithstanding, while older people showed themselves resigned to the winds of change. All were eager to demonstrate Islam's moderation and tolerance towards others.

The paradoxical situation of liberalisation by autocratic fiat is reflected in the reconfiguration of the Saudi Salafi camp. The religious establishment under Grand Mufti Abd al-Aziz Al al-Shaykh and Salih al-Fawzan, which in the past half century had been gradually subdued to the political authority and turned quietist, had no choice but to acquiesce to the reforms. Under Muhammad bin Salman even their legitimisation is no more asked, while scholars who proactively preach loyalty to the rulers in whatever they deem right are on the rise. On the other side of the fence, the activist Salafi dissent movement split into rival factions under the contradictory pressures of the socio-cultural opening up and political repression. Some have joined the government in its anti-terrorism campaign, while others have enlisted to al-Qaida or ISIS in their quest to turn Saudi Arabia into an Islamic state. In between the loyalists and the militants are those Salafis who seek to influence the course of reforms by peaceful means. These, too, have split over the past few years, into two opposing camps: conservatives who strive to turn the tide of liberalisation, with a special focus on the issues of religious education and women's segregation, and progressives who in the name of democracy and freedom of speech wish to see liberalisation extended to the political and intellectual fields.¹⁶

To the latter group belong the veteran activist Shaykh Salman al-Awda, whose arguments are expounded in this volume by Usaama al-Azami, and the theologian Hatim al-Awni, whose ideas Bano analyses towards the end of her chapter. Both use the Salafi methodology but combine it with a tacit acceptance of Western concepts. Al-Awda's assertion in the wake of the Arab Uprisings that obedience to the ruler is ultimately contingent on freely and willingly pledging allegiance (*bay'a*) to him amounts to an advocacy of the liberal ideas of popular revolution and democracy in the face of the Saudi autocracy. Al-Awni's emphasis on the importance of openness and deliberation in matters of creed (*'aqida*), along with his claim that a rigid understanding of the concepts of *takfir* and *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* (loyalty [to Muslims] and disavowal [of non-Muslims]) plays into the hands of the jihadists, challenges the core creed of Wahhabism.¹⁷ Bano and her team refer to the progressive wing of the dissent movement by the term 'post-Salafism'.¹⁸ Yet, from the longer perspective of the whole twentieth century, it rather represents a revival of the political and intellectual ideas of the early non-Wahhabi modernist Salafis,

such as ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi.¹⁹ This occurred to me while perusing the Islamic shelf in a prominent bookstore in Medina, where I was delighted to find the works of Kawakibi, the subject of my latest book, in place of the usual Wahhabi stock.

The Arab Spring Effect

The so-called Arab Spring was a major watershed in the trajectory of the contemporary Salafi trend, as in the recent history of the Middle East at large. The mass demonstrations that spread like wildfire throughout the region in 2010–11 were motivated by civil and economic rather than purely religious concerns. Already by early 2012, however, Islamic movements, both Islamist and Salafi, became principal players in the events, either through the ballot box (as in Tunisia and Egypt), or through armed resistance (as in Syria, Yemen and Libya). The train of events differed considerably from one Arab country to another, although the monarchies – Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates, Morocco and Jordan – generally proved better disposed to contain the unrest than presidential systems, partly due to their higher Islamic credentials. Among the Arab republics, the hardly contenting outcomes ranged from ‘flawed democracies’ over restored autocratic governments to civil wars and chaos.²⁰

Salafism had been on the rise in many countries of the region already on the eve of the uprisings. Its quietist wing was favoured by autocratic regimes, and in some cases it penetrated even the Muslim Brotherhood;²¹ jihadist militancy found a wide scope for action in areas of conflict: Algeria in 1990s, Lebanon, and Iraq in the aftermath of the American invasion of 2003. Under the impact of the Arab Spring Salafism underwent major modifications, realignments and mutations. The quietists were split between the Madkhali loyalists, who followed the Saudi lead in declaring any defiance of the government (not sparing even the opposition to the Alawite Assad) *fitna*, and the more political elements who showed themselves ready to play the democratic game in order to Islamise society and state. Once the democratic trail seemed to falter, some of the politicians were quick to return to the quietist fold, while others joined the jihadi-Salafi militias, which gathered under their banner veteran global jihadists and all sorts of local disaffected protestors.²²

Many chapters in this volume testify to the centrality of the Arab Spring

in the development of today's Salafism. Each chapter is situated in a particular country and engages with the peculiarities of one or more of the local Salafi groups. Yet, together they allow us to form some more general conclusions about the motivations that animated the Salafis, the inner dynamics and rivalries among their factions, their shifting relations with the state and with the Islamists, and the changes they underwent in the process.

From Guy Eyre's ethnographic study of the Moroccan Salafi scene, we can learn how monarchies manipulated the politicisation of the quietists in their endeavour to contain the unrest. Relations between the state and the Salafis were tense since the Casablanca bombings of 2003, which led to a crackdown on all Salafis and the imposition of an official version of traditional 'Moroccan Islam'. After the breaking up of the protests, the Moroccan regime introduced them back to the public sphere, hoping to harness them for its side in the upcoming parliamentary elections of 2012. Quietist Salafis such as Muhammad al-Maghraoui, head of the widespread *Dor al-Quran* network, dutifully disavowed their habitual rejection of participation in politics, but tended to support the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), rather than the government's choice. As the authorities again turned against them in 2013, some reverted to their former quietist positions, while others attempted to join the PJD or form their own Salafi party, steps which the government was adamant to prevent. Similar tendencies in the relations between the monarchy and the Salafis are observable in the Jordanian case as well.²³

Neil Russell's study of the Salafis of Egypt indicates which strategies quietists in the Arab republics could adopt during their short-lived democratic period. It focuses on the almost century-old *Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya*, which decided to expand its activities of *da'wa* and charity works, rather than form a political party. This, however, did not mean that it forwent the democratic game. Reformulating its understanding of *da'wa* to include engagement in the political arena, it played a central role in the creation of a Salafi-Islamist bloc to foster Egypt's Islamic identity in the face of the secular revolutionary forces. Although disappointed with Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood government and professing fealty to al-Sisi's military coup, Ansar's posture as the flag-bearer of supra-factional Islamic activism made it a target of the new authoritarian regime. In comparison with Tunisia

– where quietist Salafism was less entrenched, the al-Nahda Islamist government more prudent and the jihadi-Salafi faction stronger – a closer look at Ansar is bound to add important insights on each of these variables.²⁴

Kristin Diwan's study of Kuwaiti Salafism demonstrates what formidable pitfalls awaited the politicians over the course of the Arab Spring. Activist Salafis in this relatively open constitutional monarchy predated the Saudi Islamic Awakening and, in contrast to their less fortunate comrades, were allowed to participate in the elections to the National Assembly as early as 1981, winning two seats. In the 1990s they splintered between pro-government and opposition factions, the more progressive among the latter regrouping in 2005 under Hakim al-Mutairi in the Umma Party. Al-Mutairi prioritised political liberation over religious reform and ritual, and advocated pluralism, freedom of expression and the protection of human rights, which were translated in the party programme into a rejection of religious censorship and women's enfranchisement. Such positions made it a prototype of the political wing of neo-modernist Salafism. The 2011 demonstrations prompted al-Mutairi to demand profound constitutional reform. The ensuing political crisis led him to forge a regional Umma Conference, even though its protagonists in Saudi Arabia and the UAE were immediately detained. It nevertheless immersed itself in fundraising and later organising militias and even fighting on the Sunni side in the Syrian civil war, but this put it on the terrorist organisations list. As the tide turned against the rebels, the Umma Party's remnants in exile espoused the cause of a Turkish-led caliphate. Here a comparison with the North American and European Salafi scenes is most pertinent.²⁵

The Challenge of Jihadism

The rise of jihadi violence – from Sadat's assassination, over the atrocities of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) in the Algerian civil war, to 9/11 and ISIS's barbarities – has shocked world public opinion and generated havoc among the Arab and Muslim peoples. The dispersal of al-Qaida following the American invasion of Afghanistan led to a decentralisation of Islamic terrorist operations, with eventual autonomy for local entrepreneurs. Among these were al-Qaida regional networks, most notably in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and in Iraq (AQI) – the precursor of IS; local jihadi groups such as al-Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram in Nigeria, or Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis

in Sinai; and all sorts of home-grown terrorists and lone wolves that spread throughout the Muslim world and in the West.²⁶ The Arab Spring brought in its wake a militarisation of the jihad, as armed militias were formed in countries in which peaceful demonstrations descended into civil war and chaos. Although hunted down and defeated in the Middle East and in the global arena, militant jihad is not going to disappear as long as the political and socio-economic conditions that nourish it continue to prevail.

Jihadi-Salafism had been shaped in the 1980s and 1990s on the battlefields of Afghanistan, through the merger of the radical Islamist ideas of Sayyid Qutb and Abd al-Salam Faraj with the militant creed of the original Wahhabiyya. Its quintessential prototype, al-Qaida, turned the priority of the jihad from the 'near enemy' – 'infidel' Muslim rulers and societies – to the 'far enemy' – the United States.²⁷ Jihadi-Salafism, even more than Salafism in general, remains a poorly defined and loose-end concept. It denotes a faction that, on one hand, is part of a broader jihadist camp that encompasses indigenous purely Qutbist organisations and that, on the other hand, includes Wahhabi-inspired ideologues of jihad, such as the highly influential Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.²⁸ On the operational side, jihadi-Salafi groups differ widely in terms of their political behaviour and goals, social bases and organisation, strategic considerations and tactical alliances.²⁹ Their recruits come from veteran jihadis, disillusioned quietist and activist Salafis, and civil elements who long for security, livelihood and dignity.

The final section of this volume demonstrates the extent to which the enormous escalation of violence over the past twenty years has destabilised the Salafi field and the Islamic movement at large. Each of the chapters tackles one particular arena of the ideational and actual antagonisms that reign the interactions of Salafi-jihadis among themselves and with other groups. Their critical reading urges us to think over the adequacy and applicability of the concept of jihadi-Salafism, the relative weight of strategy and tactics versus ideology and theology in the conduct of jihadi-Salafis, the opportunities and constraints that condition their activity, as well as the prospects for the (re)emergence of an alternative, more tolerant Salafi vision.

For the Saudi loyalist quietists, jihadi-Salafism poses a double, theological as well as political, challenge. Both al-Qaida and Maqdisi have declared the Saudi regime infidel, not least because of its alliance with the West, at

the same time that they claim to derive their jihadi principles from ‘true’ Wahhabism, a claim that since 9/11 finds an echo in the West. The Wahhabi establishment’s response as presented by Abdullah bin Khaled Al-Saud, is thus the other side of Saudi Arabia opening up. The gist of it is to de-emphasise Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s use of *takfir* against fellow Muslims and the mainstream Wahhabi adoption of the principle of *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* after him,³⁰ while attributing the key jihadi conceptualisations – whether ISIS’s violent eschatological caliphate or the more generally applied excommunication and rebellion – to Muslim Brotherhood militancy. Against the quietist partisan discursive strategy, one may recognise both militant and quietist interpretations within the Wahhabi tradition and examine the actual religious socio-political conditions that made Qutb’s and Faraj’s formulations so attractive for young Saudis.

The greatest challenge to jihadi-Salafism from within the Islamic field, however, comes from internal jihadi debates and infighting. Violence has soared since the arrival on the scene of ISIS and its endeavour to monopolise the jihadi struggle in the Syrian civil war and other arenas. Tore Hamming employs in his chapter the social movement approach in an attempt to construct a general theory of intra-conflict in the overall Sunni Jihadi Movement. He locates the process of escalation in the intersection between political calculations and theological differences, and describes ISIS as a hegemonist group that has legitimated its fight against other jihadis first through *al-walā’ wa-l-barā’* and then through its pretensions to the global caliphate.³¹ No less important, however, is to establish criteria for distinguishing the jihadi-Salafi groups from other jihadis and to determine whether al-Qaida and ISIS, as well as their local and global militant rivals, are to be counted among the Salafi camp.

Jérôme Drevon’s chapter shifts the spotlight to the ‘jihadi light’ group of Ahrar al-Sham (Freedmen of Syria). In his historical narrative, the group’s success is ascribed to its rapid organisation as an inclusive network of local brigades operated through a consensual consultative council and a corresponding broad ideological frame that positioned it in mainstream Islamism. This pragmatic approach enabled it to unite the major Islamist groups throughout the country into a larger popular Islamic Front and propelled it to seek cooperation and funding from Western countries and foreign Islamic

groups, among them al-Mutairi's Umma Party. Concomitantly, it was careful to dissociate itself from the extremist doctrinaire jihadi-Salafi groups of ISIS and the al-Qaida-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, and to emphasise its adherence to a moderate middle way and to the living Muslim tradition. Drevon argues that Ahrar al-Sham underwent a gradual process of politicisation during the Syrian civil war, yet his analysis proves that this was equally a process of de-Salafisation.

In Palestine, the main rival of jihadi-Salafism is the Islamist organisations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. As Belal Shobaki shows in the last chapter of this volume, jihadi-Salafi organisations appeared especially in the Gaza Strip following the Israeli withdrawal and subsequent Hamas takeover in 2007, and they further strengthened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, after Hamas decided to maintain relations with al-Sisi's government in Egypt, despite its harsh repression of the Muslim Brotherhood. This special case of intra-jihadi conflict he attributes to the disappointment of Salafi-oriented elements within Hamas at the politicisation of their movement – namely, its retreat from its erstwhile uncompromising positions in favour of a more pragmatic approach towards democratic procedures, the sharing of government and a political settlement with Israel. The firm reaction of Hamas and the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank concerning the declaration of an Islamic Emirate in Gaza in 2009 and the wave of bombings against civilian targets in 2015 demonstrates the crucial role that governments, however fragile and hampered, have in containing the jihadi-Salafi menace.

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The picture that emerges from the different studies in this volume of the Salafi phenomena in the first two decades of the twenty-first century is of a highly diversified and dynamic field. The adaptation of the Wahhabi religious establishment to the expedited opening up of Saudi Arabia, the prompt organisation of political parties by the Egyptian Salafi groups after the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the formation of a myriad of armed militias by jihadi-Salafis in Iraq and Syria, Libya and Yemen testify to the remarkable resilience of Salafism in its various forms. These, however, cannot conceal the unbound servility of the loyalists to repressive governments, the lack of palpable achievements on the

part of the politicos, the unspeakable atrocities perpetrated by al-Qaida and ISIS, and the utter defeat of jihadi opposition forces.

Against this general weakening of the Salafi camp over the past twenty years stands a cautious revival of the older non-Wahhabi version of Salafism. The obstacles to this neo-modernist-Salafi trend are indeed formidable. In Saudi Arabia, al-Awda has long been detained and may face the death penalty, and al-Awni has difficulties finding an audience for his views; the Kuwaiti al-Mutairi and his Umma Party's involvement in the Syrian civil war put them on the international terrorist list, while Ahrar al-Sham was decimated by a bombing that killed its entire command. Very different is the case of the American Salafi preacher-*cum*-academic Yasir Qadhi, to whom Masooda Bano turns at the end of her chapter. His reasoned use of the Salafi methodology to inculcate notions of citizenship, deliberation and tolerance of the other has found great appeal among Muslim minorities in the West. More than the political, theological or militant perspectives that have failed, it may be this practical legal approach that will enable the modernist-Salafi faction, which has been kept at bay for so long, to finally make its contribution to the realisation of a liberal and democratic Middle East.

Notes

1. See, for example, Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 1993); Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002).
2. Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); S. N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
3. Basheer M. Nafi, 'The Rise of Islamic Reformist Thought and its Challenge to Traditional Islam', in *Islamic Thought in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Suha Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 28–60.
4. See David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 155–90.
5. Reinhard Schulze, *Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Islamischen Weltliga* (Leiden: Brill, 1990), part 2.

6. Stéphane Lacroix, *The Islamic Awakening: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2011).
7. Quintan Wiktorowicz, 'The Anatomy of the Salafi Movement', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 29 (2006), 207–39.
8. Bernard Rougier (ed.), *Qu'est-ce que le salafisme?* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2008); Roel Meijer (ed.), *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone (eds), *Salafism after the Arab Spring* (London: Hurst, 2016).
9. Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); Dominique Thomas, 'Le Role d'Internet dans la diffusion de la doctrine salafite', in *Qu'est-ce que le salafisme?* ed. Rougier, *le salafisme*, 87–102.
10. Muhammad Abu-Rumman, *Al-Sira 'ala al-salafyya: gira'a fi al-idiulugiyya wa'l-khilafat wa-kharitat al-intishar* (Beirut: al-Shabka al-'arabiyya li'l-abhath wa'l-nashr, 2016).
11. See Bernard Haykel, 'On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action', in Meijer, *Global Salafism*, 33–57.
12. On him, see Stéphane Lacroix, 'Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on the Shaping of Contemporary Salafism,' in Meijer, *Global Salafism*, 58–80.
13. Itzhak Weismann, 'A Perverted Balance: Modern Salafism between Reform and Jihad', *Die Welt des Islams* 57/1 (2017), 50.
14. Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
15. David Commins, *Islam in Saudi Arabia* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2015), ch. 5.
16. See Stéphane Lacroix, 'To Rebel or Not to Rebel: Dilemmas among Saudi Salafis in a Revolutionary Age', in Cavatorta and Merone, *Salafism after the Arab Spring*, 61–82.
17. See also Madawi al-Rasheed, *Muted Modernists: The Struggle over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia* (London: Hurst, 2015).
18. Christopher Pooya Razavian, 'Post-Salafism: Salman al-Ouda and Hatim al-Awni', in *Modern Islamic Authority and Social Change, Volume 1: Evolving Debates in Muslim Majority Countries*, ed. Masooda Bano (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), 172–94.
19. See David Dean Commins, *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late*

- Ottoman Syria* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Itzchak Weismann, *Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi: Islamic Reform and Arab Revival* (London: Oneworld, 2015).
20. For an overview see, for instance, Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch (eds), *The Arab Spring: The Hope and Reality of the Uprisings* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2017).
 21. Husām Tammām, *Tasalluf al-Ikhwān: ta'ākul al-uṭrūḥa al-ikhwāniyya wa-ṣu'ūd al-Salafiyya fī jama'āt al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn* (Alexandria: Maktabat al-Iskandariyya, 2010).
 22. Cavatorta and Merone, *Salafism after the Arab Spring*.
 23. See Joas Wagemakers, *Salafism in Jordan: Political Islam in a Quietist Community* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
 24. Emmanuel Karagiannis, 'The Rise of Electoral Salafism in Egypt and Tunisia: The Use of Democracy as a Master Frame', *Journal of North African Studies* 24 (2019), 207–25.
 25. See, for instance, Sadek Hamid, *Sufis, Salafis and Islamists: The Contested Ground of British Islamic Activism* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2016).
 26. Marc Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
 27. Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
 28. Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muahmmad al-Maqdisi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
 29. See Thomas Hegghammer, 'Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism,' in Meijer, *Global Salafism*, 244–67.
 30. For such a 'liberal' view of Wahhabism, see Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2007).
 31. For a similar approach to the Algerian civil war of the 1990s, see Mohammed M. Hafez, 'From Marginalisation to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA Violence in Algeria', in *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Approach*, ed. Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004), 37–60.